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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal from the Third District Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j) and may transfer this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(4) . The Utah Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (k) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court error in granting CTX's Motion 
to Enforce the Settlement Agreement in this case, thereby allowing 
CTX to unilaterally change the terms of the global settlement 
offered to Rukavina. Should Rukavina be forced to settle this case 
on terms involving the settlement of four other cases which were 
never complied with. Should CTX be allowed to seek enforcement of 
the separate terms of the global settlement offered in this case, 
while proceeding contrary to the settlement offer in the other 
cases. Did CTX waive its right to claim a settlement in this case 
by proceeding with litigation in this case and by proceeding with 
litigation in the other cases. 
a. Standard of Review. The issue as to whether a 
contract of settlement exists between the parties is a question of 
law for the court to decide, and thus, is subject to a complete 
review for correctness. Hern Hughes & Sons Inc. v. Ouintek, 834 
P.2d 582, 583 (Ut.App. 1992). 
b. Preservation for Review. This issue was raised 
on CTX's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. (Record 711-
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712) . The court made a ruling on the Motion subjecting it to 
appellate review. (Record 897-899). 
2. Did the trial court error in its ruling granting 
CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Striking Extrinsic 
Evidence. 
a. Standard of Review. The review of the trial 
court's ruling on judgment on the pleadings is a question of law, 
which does not require any deference to the trial court. Judgment 
on the pleadings is only appropriate when the pleadings, viewed 
with all inference in favor of the non-moving party, fail to show 
any set of facts for which the non-moving party might recover. 
Young v. Texas Co. , 331 P.2d 1099 (1953) . The trial court's ruling 
on a judgment on the pleadings is subject to complete review for 
correctness. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah App. 1990), 
b. Preservation for Review. This issue was raised 
on CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Record 35-37). The 
court made a ruling on the Motion subjecting it to appellate 
review. (Record 121-122). 
3. Did the trial court error in ruling, as a matter of 
law, that the option provision in the lease was too indefinite to 
be enforceable, yet not ambiguous, so as to allow the consideration 
of parol evidence. Did the trial court error in failing to 
consider parol evidence in relation to the lease and option 
provision. Should the court have considered parol evidence in 
determining whether or not the lease or option provision was 
intended as an integrated contract. 
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a. Standard of Review, The issue as to the 
ambiguity of contractual language is a question of law, subject to 
complete review for correctness. Equitable Life & Casualty v. 
Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Ut.App. 1993) cert, denied 860 P.2d 943. 
b. Preservation for Review. This issue was raised 
on CTX's Motion to Strike Extrinsic Evidence. (Record 86-88). The 
court made a ruling on the Motion preserving the issue for 
appellate review. (Record 121-122). 
4. Did the trial court error in retroactively reinstat-
ing the April 20. 1993 Judgment after it was vacated by the court 
for lack of standing and jurisdiction, pursuant to § 16-10a-1502 
UCA. Can the court retroactively give a foreign corporation legal 
standing to maintain an action. 
a. Standard of Review. The review of the trial 
court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which 
does not require any deference to the trial court. The trial 
court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen. 865 
P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
b. Preservation for Review. This issue was raised 
on CTX's Motion to Reinstate Judgment and for Judgment on the 
Pleadings. (Record 290-291). The court made a ruling on the Motion 
preserving the issue for appellate review. (Record 547-551). 
5. Did the trial court error in denying Rukavina's 
Motion to Amend. Was it prejudicial to CTX Properties to allow 
Rukavina to amend his Complaint in this case. 
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a. Standard of Review. The standard of review for 
a motion to amend is abuse of discretion. Christensen v. Jewekes, 
761 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1988). 
b. Preservation for Review. This issue was raised 
on Rukavina's Motion to Amend. (Record 310-331). The court made a 
ruling on the Motion preserving the issue for appellate review. 
(Record 547-551). 
6- Did the trial court error in striking Rukavina's 
Motion to Enforce for the Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties 
vs. Barney. 900903134 PR, which is based on a separate contract 
from the lease and option provision ruled on in CTX's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings. Should the trial court have considered 
the Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties vs. Barney. 900903134 
PR, in this case, which is a separate contract from the lease and 
option provision. 
a. Standard of Review. The review of the trial 
court's ruling on a motion to strike is a question of law, which 
does not require any deference to the trial court. Motions to 
strike should be granted only when there are no disputed issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The trial court's ruling is reviewed for correct-
ness. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah App. 1990). 
b. Preservation for Review. This issue was raised 
on Rukavina's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement with 
Barney, (Record 306-309), and CTX's Motion to Strike Rukavina's 
Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement with Barney. (Record 
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403-406). The court made a ruling on these Motions preserving the 
issue for appellate review. (Record 549). 
7. Did the trial court error in dismissing the Third 
Party Complaint as against the Third Party Defendant Barney, 
pursuant to Rule 4 URCP, after Barney had accepted service of the 
Third Party Compliant and had filed an Answer in the case. 
a. Standard of Review. The review of the trial 
court's ruling on the interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law, which does not require any deference to the trial court. The 
trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen, 
865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
b. Preservation for Review. This issue was raised 
on CTX's Motion to Dismiss. (Record 471-473). The court made a 
ruling on this Motion preserving the issue for appellate review. 
(Record 547-551). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. 16-10A-1502. Consequences of transacting 
business without authority. 
(1) A foreign corporation transacting business in this 
state without authority, or anyone in its behalf, may not maintain 
a proceeding in any court in this state until an application for 
authority to transact business is filed with the division. 
Utah Code Ann. 68-3-3. Retroactive effect. 
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 4. Process. 
* * * 
(b) Time of Service. In an action commenced under Rule 
3(a) (1) , the summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be 
served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint 
unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause 
shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely served, the 
action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any 
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party or upon the court's own initiative. In an action brought 
against two or more defendants on which service is obtained upon 
one of them within the 120 days or such longer period as may be 
allowed by the court, the other or others may be served or appear 
at any time prior to trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Proceedings 
On or about November 13, 1992, CTX Properties, ("CTX") 
filed a Complaint against Andy Rukavina ("Rukavina") for eviction 
and unlawful detainer of the premises at 5646 Magic Isle Lane, 
Murray, Utah ("Property"), claiming that Rukavina's lease had 
expired. 
On or about December 2, 1992, Rukavina filed an Answer, 
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint alleging, among other 
things, that the lease contained an option to purchase which he 
timely exercised, or in good faith attempted to exercise, entitling 
him to possession of the property. 
Rukavina also filed a Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint against CTX, Michael Wright, Jill Wright (principals of 
CTX Properties) and Eloise Barney (an employee of CTX Properties) 
to enforce the option provision, or in the alternative, to recover 
costs for his improvements to the property, and to recover the 
additional 20% payments he made during the lease term, based on the 
option provision and representations made to him by CTX and the 
Third Party Defendants, that the cost of his improvements and 
additional payments would be credited towards his purchase price of 
the property. 
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Course of the Proceedings 
and Disposition Below 
On January 28, 1993, CTX filed a Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings based on the argument that the option provision in 
the lease failed to state a purchase price and thus, as a matter of 
law, was too indefinite to be enforceable, yet was not vague or 
ambiguous so as to allow the court to consider extrinsic evidence. 
(Record 35-37). Rukavina filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
asserting that the option provision was ambiguous in its relation 
to a purchase price (Record 77-85) and submitted Affidavits from 
Rukavina and Barney (the employee of CTX who negotiated the lease) 
setting forth the specific terms that were agreed to by the parties 
when the lease was entered into, including their agreement to 
calculate a purchase price for the option. (Record 38-69). 
The Affidavit of Barney shows that CTX agreed to honor 
the lease and the option provision at a later time in a separate 
contract, that being a Settlement Agreement reached in a case 
previously filed between Barney and CTX in the Third District 
Court, CTX Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 PR. The Affidavit of 
Rukavina shows that he performed throughout the five year lease 
under the terms of the agreement he reached with Barney of CTX, to 
be able to exercise the option. 
CTX filed a Motion to Strike the Extrinsic Evidence and 
to Strike any Reference to the Settlement Agreement in CTX 
Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 PR. (Record 86-88). Judge Stirba 
granted CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and granted 
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CTX's Motion to Strike, on April 5, 1993. An Order was entered on 
April 20, 1993. (Record 121-127). 
The April 20, 1993 Order was later vacated by the court 
in November 1994, for lack of jurisdiction. This was based on the 
fact that CTX was a foreign corporation not registered to do 
business in Utah and thus lacked standing to bring suit, pursuant 
to § 16-10a-1502 (1) UCA. (Record 237-243). The court vacated the 
judgment and the parties stipulated that CTX could retain posses-
sion of the home. The court reserved ruling on whether the April 
20, 1993 Judgment was void or voidable under § 16-10a-1502. 
(Record 304-305) . 
On December 9, 1994, Rukavina filed a Motion to Amend the 
Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim. (Record 310-331); a Motion to 
Enforce the Option Agreement contained in the lease (Record 322-
335) ; and a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement in CTX 
Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 ?R, wherein CTX agreed with Barney 
to honor the lease and option provision with Rukavina. (Record 
306-309) . 
CTX filed a Motion to Reinstate the Judgment on the 
Pleadings (Record 292-299), a Motion to Compel Discovery (Record 
268-269), a Motion to Strike Rukavina's Motion to Enforce the 
Option Agreement and to Strike Rukavina's Motion to enforce the 
Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 PR, 
(Record 407-412) and a Motion to Dismiss the Third Party Complaint 
due to the lack of timely service under Rule 4 (b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. (Record 471-473). The Third Party Defendant, 
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Barney, had already accepted service of the Third Party Complaint 
(Record 423-425) and had filed an Answer to the Third Party 
Complaint. (Record 531-538). 
These motions were heard by the court on January 30, 
1995. The court granted CTX's Motion to Reinstate the April 20, 
1993 Judgment, allowing CTX's standing and jurisdiction to be 
applied retroactively. The court, took under advisement whether 
the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should be converted to a 
motion for summary judgment, in consideration of the affidavits and 
exhibits submitted by the parties and whether the lease was 
intended as an integrated contract to the exclusion of extrinsic 
evidence. The court indicated that it would review the complete 
file and issue a written ruling. (Record 470, 545). No written 
ruling was issued. 
Rukavina's Motion to Amend was denied as untimely and 
prejudicial to CTX. (Record 549) . Based on the denial of the 
Motion to Amend and the granting of CTX's Motion to Reinstate 
Judgment on the Pleadings, the court granted CTX's Motion to Strike 
Rukavina's Motions for Enforcement of the Option Agreement and the 
Enforcement of the Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties vs. 
Barney. (Record 549) . The court also dismissed the Third Party 
Complaint as against the Third Party Defendants for lack of timely 
service (Record 814-816), although Third Party Defendant Barney 
executed an Acceptance of Service and filed an Answer in the case. 
(Record 547-551). The remaining issues, i.e., reimbursement for 
improvements and the 20% additional payments, were set for trial. 
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CTX simultaneously with this case, was pursuing four 
other cases, which involved Rukavina or his immediate family 
members. CTX Properties v. Anthony Duran. Civil No. 930904765 CN; 
ASR Inc. v. Mark Duran, Civil No. 920906315 PR, Rukavina v. 
Triatlantic. Civil No. 910907087 CV, and CTX Properties vs. Barney, 
900903134 PR (the one mentioned before with Barney, a former CTX 
employee). Mark Duran and Anthony Duran, are step-brothers of 
Rukavina and both signed similar lease and option contracts with 
CTX and ASR Inc., (ASR Inc. is an alleged successor-in-interest to 
CTX) to purchase their homes in the Murray, Utah area. CTX was 
seeking to evict Mark Duran and Anthony Duran from each of their 
homes. Rukavina's mother was and is currently living with Anthony 
Duran in his home. (Record 817-818, 824-825) . 
On March 14, 1995, CTX's legal counsel sent a letter to 
Rukavina's counsel offering a global settlement of all five cases. 
The letter states, "[m]y clients are desirous of settling, finally, 
all of the above actions, but is only willing to settle them 
together as a package." (Record 720). This letter entailed among 
other things, the payment to Rukavina of $2,500.00 for dismissal of 
this case, plus the payment of $2,500.00 to Mark Duran for the 
dismissal of his case and most importantly that Anthony Duran would 
be able to purchase his home, where he and Rukavina's mother have 
been living for over the past five years (emphasis added) . In the 
purchase of Anthony Duran's home, it provided that each party could 
submit an appraisal to determine the purchase price. (Record 721) . 
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There were modifications made to the offer on two of the 
cases, i.e., Anthony Duran could obtain payment of $2,500.00 if he 
provided independent financing for the purchase of his home and 
Triatlantic would forgive its judgment for costs against Rukavina 
in Rukavina v. Triatlantic, No. 910907087 CV. (Record 825). 
While Settlement Agreements were being prepared for 
signature, the parties continued to negotiate terms regarding the 
purchase of Anthony Duran's home. Anthony Duran had obtained an 
appraisal for $71,500.00 on the home, and requested that he be able 
to submit this appraisal in determining the purchase price. 
Rukavina and Anthony Duran both requested that this be expressly 
provided for in the Settlement Agreements. CTX, however, refused 
to agree to this. As a result, the Settlement Agreements prepared 
were never agreed to or executed in any of the cases. (Record 825-
826) . 
During this period of time, CTX continued with litigation 
in this case. There was a Scheduling Conference held and a new 
trial date was set for May 23, 1995, (Record 698) and CTX proceeded 
with its Renewed Motion to Compel against Rukavina, which was heard 
by the court on April 3, 1995, more than two weeks after the March 
14, 1995 letter and while the parties were still discussing terms 
for the purchase of Anthony Duran's home. (Record 709-710). 
Then on April 10, 1995, CTX Properties filed Motions to 
Enforce the Settlement Agreement in this case (Record 711-713) and 
in the other cases. In Mark Duran's case, Judge Iwasaki found no 
meeting of the minds as to all the essential terms and denied CTX's 
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Motion to Compel Settlement. (See Addendum, Exhibit "F") . In 
Anthony Duran's case, CTX withdrew their Motion to Compel Settle-
ment and continued with eviction proceedings against Anthony Duran 
and Rukavina's mother. (See Addendum Exhibit "G"). The agreement 
that Anthony Duran would be able to purchase his home was a major 
factor in Rukavina's agreement to the global settlement. CTX's 
Motion to Compel Settlement in Rukavina v. Triatlantic was also 
denied by Judge Wilkinson. (See Addendum Exhibit "H") . (This case 
is currently on appeal, on other grounds, before the Utah Supreme 
Court, Appeal No. 950172) . 
There was no agreement reached with Rukavina regarding 
the settlement of CTX Properties v. Barney, and this, although it 
is contained in the letter of March 14, 1995, was not included in 
any of the Settlement Agreements prepared. 
At the hearing on June 12, 1995, CTX for the first time 
indicated that it wanted to unilaterally separate the settlement 
offer made in this case from the global settlement first proposed. 
Rukavina never would have agreed to settle this case on the terms 
offered in this case alone, without the settlement of the other 
cases, and particularly without the agreement that Anthony Duran 
would be able to purchase his home. CTX actually withdrew its 
Motion for Settlement in Anthony Duran's case and was proceeding 
with eviction. 
Although Rukavina is not a party the Anthony Duran case, 
he is a party in this case and in Rukavina v. Triatlantic in which 
Judge Wilkinson denied settlement and which is currently on appeal, 
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on other grounds, before the Utah Supreme Court. (Appeal No. 
950172) . 
Judge Stirba allowed CTX to unilaterally separate the 
terms of the global settlement offered and granted CTX's Motion to 
Enforce Settlement in this case, while allowing CTX to continue 
with litigation in the other cases. A final order was entered on 
September 20, 1995. (Record 897-900). 
This appeal is from the final order of Judge Stirba 
entered on September 20, 1995, granting CTX's Motion to Enforce the 
Settlement Agreement. Appeal is also taken from Judge Stirba's 
ruling granting CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to 
Strike Extrinsic Evidence, entered on April 20, 1993; Judge 
Stirba's ruling retroactively reinstating the April 20, 1993 
Judgment after it was vacated; Judge Stirba's denial of Rukavina's 
Motion to Amend; Judge Stirba's ruling striking Rukavina's Motion 
for Enforcement of the Lease and Option Provision; and Striking 
Rukavina's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement in CTX 
Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 PR; and Judge Stirba's dismissal 
of the Third Party Complaint as against the Third Party Defendant 
Eloise Barney, after Barney had accepted service and filed an 
Answer in the case. 
Statement of Facts 
1. In 1987, Eloise Barney, Property Manager for CTX 
Properties, inquired whether Rukavina would be interested in 
renting certain real property belonging to CTX Properties commonly 
known as 5646 Magic Isle Lane. Rukavina informed Ms. Barney that 
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he was not interested in renting a 4-bedroom house. (Record 203, 
214) . 
2. Ms. Barney approached Rukavina again with an offer 
to lease the property for an extended period with an option to 
purchase the property at the end of that period, certain amounts of 
the rental payments during the lease (20%), would also be credited 
toward the down payment or purchase price of the property. (Record 
203, 214) . 
3. Ms. Barney, as agent and Property Manager for CTX 
Properties, negotiated and drafted, with the direct assistance of 
Wright, the lease and option agreement entered into between CTX 
Properties and Rukavina. (Record 213-214). 
4. It was agreed between CTX and Rukavina, at the time, 
that the sales price on the option was to be determined by Rukavina 
obtaining an appraisal and CTX obtaining an appraisal at the end of 
the lease, and then taking the average of the two appraisals. 
(Record 214) . 
5. Rukavina agreed to lease the property in reliance on 
the representation by Ms. Barney that through the option to 
purchase, he could become the owner at the end of the lease. On or 
about July 1, 1987, the lease was signed by Ms. Barney as Property 
Manager for CTX and by Rukavina. (Record 214) . The lease was for 
a five year period from July 1, 1987 through July 1, 1992. (Lease 
is Exhibit "A" to Complaint, Record 5). 
6. Ms. Barney and Rukavina agreed to a purchase price 
for the option at the time the lease was signed, by taking the 
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average of two appraisals to be obtained by each party at the end 
of the lease. (Record 2 04) . The following language was expressly 
added to the lease form used by CTX Properties: 
At the time of the expiration of said lease, 
20% of lease payments shall either be credited 
toward the down payment or towards the pur-
chase price of the above-referenced home. 
Each agent shall obtain a separate appraisal 
and at that time a fair sales price shall be 
determined. (Record 9) 
7. Rukavina also relied on CTX's promise to finance the 
purchase, if Rukavina so elected, at the end of the lease. (Record 
205) . 
8. In 1987 Rukavina took possession of the property and 
made payments during the term of the lease which included the 20% 
premium, over and above the prevailing market rental rates, for the 
option provision. (Record 204) . 
9. In 1990 CTX initiated a lawsuit against Eloise C. 
Barney, CTX Properties, Inc. v. Eloise C. Barney. Civil No. 
900903134 PR, which resulted in the execution of a Settlement 
Agreement, wherein Eloise C. Barney settled her claims with Michael 
Wright and CTX Properties. (Record 215). 
10. As a condition of said settlement, Barney, aware of 
the agreement and representations made with Rukavina regarding his 
lease and property, required that Michael Wright and CTX Properties 
agree to honor Rukavina's lease and option agreement for the 
purchase of his home at 5646 South Magic Isle Lane, the property at 
issue in this case. (Record 215) . The Settlement Agreement 
provides: 
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(6) Wright et. al. have agreed and do hereby agree 
that certain real property leases (described in the 
Fourth Cause of Action of Wright's Complaint) made for or 
on behalf of Wright et. al., as lessor, . . . with Andy 
Rukavina respecting the real property known as 5646 South 
Magic Isle Lane, Murray, Utah, are valid and binding 
lease agreements which contain a valid option to purchase 
as more fully set forth in the lease copies in the 
possession of Wright et. al., Wright et. al. agrees for 
the benefit of the persons aforedescribed who are the 
lessees stated in such leases that Wright et. al. will 
honor the terms of such leases and the options to 
purchase stated therein and waive any damage claim or 
other claims arising out of the recording of notices of 
interest that were filed of record by such parties. 
(Record 221). 
11. It was intended that Rukavina be a beneficiary of 
the foregoing provision, in that it was to resolve any and all 
disputes over the option to purchase. (Record 216). As a further 
condition of settlement, Michael Wright and CTX Properties waived 
any damage claims they may have against Rukavina for any Notice of 
Interests filed on the property by Rukavina. (Record 221). 
12. CTX Properties indicated to Rukavina that CTX would 
honor the option in the lease. In a letter dated February 27, 1992 
from Paul T. Moxley, CTX's legal counsel, to L. Benson Mabey, legal 
counsel for Rukavina, Mr. Moxley indicated that Rukavina should 
contact Michael Wright within thirty (30) days prior to the 
exercise of the option if he was interested in exercising the 
option. (Record 204, letter record 207). 
13. Rukavina gave written notice to CTX Properties that 
he intended to exercise his option and become the owner of the 
property. (Record 204). 
14. Rukavina obtained an appraisal on the property for 
$67,000.00 and submitted it to CTX in accordance with the option 
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language in the lease and the agreement reached by the parties to 
calculate a purchase price. (Record 204). 
15. CTX Properties also obtained an appraisal on the 
property for $78,500.00 in accordance with the option language in 
the lease and the agreement reached by the parties to calculate a 
purchase price. Rukavina tendered $72,750.00 the average of the 
two appraisals to purchase the property. (Record 204). 
16. In a letter dated September 2, 1992, CTX indicated 
that it would accept $72,750.00, the average of the two appraisals, 
as the purchase price. CTX also agreed to provide financing at 2 
1/2 points above prime. (Record 205, letter record 211) The only 
issue remaining concerned any amounts to be given as credits to 
Rukavina's purchase price of the property. (Record 205, 211). 
17. Suddenly, CTX would not allow Rukavina to purchase 
the property unless he dropped an unrelated lawsuit against Michael 
Wright (principal of CTX) titled Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, 
Inc. . et al. . Civil No. 910907087 CV. When Rukavina refused to 
drop the lawsuit against Wright, CTX began this eviction proceeding 
on November 13, 1992. (Record 1-15, 205, 211). 
18. Rukavina relied on the validity of the option 
provision contained in the lease drafted by CTX. He believed that 
he was entitled to possession of the property pursuant to the lease 
and option agreement and under the Settlement Agreement reached in 
CTX Properties vs. Barney. 900903134 PR wherein CTX specifically 
agreed to honor the option in Rukavina's lease. (Record 215-216, 
221) . 
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19. Rukavina filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third 
Party Complaint on December 2, 1992, alleging that he timely 
exercised his option to purchase. Rukavina also counterclaimed and 
complained against Third Party Defendants, Michael Wright, Jill 
Wright and Eloise Barney, for declaratory relief that the option to 
purchase was valid and timely exercised, or in the alternative for 
the costs of his improvements on the property and additional rent 
payments made for the option. (Record 19-27). 
20. As to Rukavina7s Answer, Counterclaim and Third 
Party Complaint, the counterclaim was answered by CTX on December 
28, 1992. (Record 28-34). On January 17, 1995, Third Party 
Defendant, Eloise Barney, accepted service of the Answer, Counter-
claim and Third Party Complaint and filed an Answer, Counterclaim 
and Cross-claim on February 16, 1995. (Record 531-538). 
21. On January 28, 1993, CTX filed a Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings. (Record 35-37). Rukavina filed a memorandum in 
opposition and submitted affidavits setting forth the specific 
terms reached to determine the purchase price for the option to 
purchase the property and also the settlement reached in CTX 
Properties v. Barney, 900903134 PR, wherein CTX agreed to honor the 
lease and option provision entered into with Rukavina for the 
property. (Record 38-69). 
22. CTX filed a Motion to Strike the Extrinsic Evidence 
and to Strike any Reference to the Settlement Agreement in CTX 
Properties vs. Barney. 900903134 PR. (Record 86-88). Judge Stirba 
granted CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and granted 
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CTX's Motion to Strike, on April 5, 1993. An Order was entered on 
April 20, 1993. (Record 121-127). 
23. The April 20, 1993 Order was later vacated by the 
court in November 1994, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
This was based on the fact that CTX Properties was a foreign 
corporation not registered to do business in Utah and thus lacked 
standing to bring suit, pursuant to § 16-10a-1502(1) UCA. (Record 
237-243) . The court vacated judgment and the parties stipulated 
that CTX could retain possession of the home. The court reserved 
ruling on whether the April 20, 1993 Judgment was void or voidable 
under § 16-10a-1502. (Record 304-305). 
24. On November 18, 1994, the court held a Scheduling 
Conference. A bench trial was set for March 28, 1995. A discovery 
deadline was set for February 28, 1995; and a cut-off date for 
filing motions was set for December 9, 1994. The Court also set 
January 30, 1995 as a date to hear all pending motions. (Record 
303) . 
25. On December 9, 1994, Rukavina filed a Motion to 
Amend the Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim (Record 310-331); a 
Motion to Enforce the Option Agreement contained in the lease 
(Record 322-335); and a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement 
in CTX Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 PR, whereby CTX agreed with 
Barney to honor the lease and option provision with Rukavina. 
(Record 306-309) . 
26. CTX Properties filed a Motion to Reinstate the 
Judgment on the Pleadings (Record 292-299), a Motion to Compel 
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Discovery (Record 268-269), a Motion to Strike Rukavina's Motion to 
Enforce the Option Agreement and to Strike Rukavina's Motion to 
enforce the Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties vs. Barney. 
900903134 PR, (Record 407-412) and a Motion to Dismiss the Third 
Party Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, due to the lack of timely 
service under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Record 
471-473) . 
27. The Third Party Defendant, Eloise Barney, had 
already accepted service of the Third Party Complaint (Record 423-
425) and had filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint. (Record 
531-538). 
28. On January 30, 1995, the court granted CTX's Motion 
to Reinstate the April 20, 1993 Judgment, allowing standing and 
jurisdiction to be applied retroactively. The court, took under 
advisement whether the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should 
be converted to a motion for summary judgment, in consideration of 
the affidavits and exhibits submitted by the parties, and whether 
the lease was intended as an integrated contract to the exclusion 
of extrinsic evidence. The court indicated that it would review 
the complete file and issue a written ruling. (Record 470, 545). 
No written ruling was issued. 
29. Rukavina's Motion to Amend was denied as untimely 
and prejudicial to CTX. (Record 549). Based on the denial of 
Rukavina's Motion to Amend and its Reinstatement of Judgment on the 
Pleadings, the court granted CTX's Motion to Strike Rukavina's 
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Motions for Enforcement of the Option Agreement and the enforcement 
of the Settlement Agreement. (Record 549). 
30. The court also dismissed the Third Party Complaint 
as against the Third Party Defendants for lack of timely service 
(Record 814-816), although Third Party Defendant Eloise Barney had 
executed an Acceptance of Service and filed an Answer in the case. 
(Record 547-551). 
31. In an attempt to negotiate a settlement of this case 
and four other cases involving CTX Properties, including CTX 
Properties v. Anthony Duran, Case No. 930904765CN; ASR. Inc. v. 
Mark and Lynette Duran. Case No. 920906315PR; and Andy Rukavina v. 
Triatlantic Ventures. Case No. 910907087CV, a letter was received 
from CTX's legal counsel, Paul Moxley, dated March 14, 1995. This 
letter offered and required a global settlement of all the above-
referenced cases based on the terms set forth in the letter. The 
letter states that CTX is only willing to settle all the cases 
together as a package. (Record 825, letter record 720-721). 
32. In discussion of the proposed global settlement 
offer telephone conversations were had on March 15, 1995, wherein 
further concessions were made. It was agreed that Anthony Duran 
would be paid the sum of $2,500.00, if he obtained independent 
financing for the purchase of his home; and Michael Wright would 
forgive the judgment he has for costs against Rukavina in the case 
of Andy Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures. Civil No. 910907087 CV. 
(Record 825). 
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33. It was proposed that Anthony Duran would be able to 
purchase from CTX the home at 60 West Stauffer Lane, Murray, Utah, 
in which he is living. This property is the subject of litigation 
in the case of CTX Properties, Inc. v. Anthony Duran, Case No. 
930904765CN. It was agreed that the purchase price would be 
determined by averaging two appraisals, one from each party. 
(Record 825). 
34. Anthony Duran had already obtained an appraisal on 
the home for $71,500.00, of which CTX was aware. On March 16, 
1995, a letter was sent to Mr. Moxley from Rukavina's counsel 
accepting CTX's global settlement offer, as contained in the March 
14, 1995 letter. (Record 825-826, letter record 723). 
35. While the settlement documents were being prepared, 
the request was made that the settlement documents expressly 
provide that Anthony Duran would be able to submit his $71,500.00 
appraisal in determining the purchase price of his home. This was 
not agreed to and the request was denied. (Record 826) . There was 
no mention of which appraisals could be used in the letter. 
(Record 720-723). 
36. The settlement documents, as drafted, were not 
accepted by Rukavina, Anthony Duran or the other parties in the 
other cases. The settlement documents as drafted were not agreed 
to and were not signed by Rukavina or the other parties in the 
other cases. (Record 826-827) . 
37. After the global settlement offer and letters of 
March 14th and 15th, the parties continued to negotiate a settle-
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ment of all the cases and continued with litigation in this case. 
CTX elected to proceed with its Motion to Compel against Rukavina 
and Motion to Dismiss the Third Party Complaint against Rukavina. 
These Motions were heard on April 3, 1995. (Record 709). 
38. On April 10, 1995, CTX filed its Motion to Enforce 
Settlement in all the cases referenced in the March 14, 1995, 
letter. (Record 711-713). 
39. CTX then withdrew its Motion to Enforce Settlement 
in the Anthony Duran case and proceeded with eviction proceedings. 
(See Exhibit "G", hereto). CTX's Motions to Enforce Settlement in 
the other cases were denied. (See Exhibits "F" & "H", hereto). 
40. The court heard oral argument on CTX's Motion to 
Enforce Settlement on June 12, 1995 and granted CTX's Motion to 
Enforce Settlement. (Record 867). On September 20, 1995, after 
several objections a Second Revised Order and Judgment was entered. 
(Record 897-899) . The Notice of Appeal was filed September 29, 
1995. (Record 901). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting CTX's Motion to Enforce 
the Settlement Agreement, which was being made as a global 
settlement of several cases, to which the parties never agreed on 
all of the terms. CTX should not be allowed to unilaterally 
withdraw its offer to settle all of the cases as proposed, in an 
attempt to hold Rukavina to the settlement terms discussed in this 
case, in anticipation of the total settlement of five cases. 
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The trial court erred in granting CTX's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings. In accepting the allegations in 
Rukavina's pleadings as true, as required on a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, Rukavina could have been entitled to possession 
of the property pursuant to the option provision contained in the 
lease, by the affirmative promises made by CTX, by the waiver by 
CTX, and/or the Settlement Agreement entered into by CTX and 
Barney, whereby CTX agreed to honor Rukavina's lease and option 
provision. 
The trial court erred in finding the lease unambiguous as 
a matter of law, and thus, precluding parol evidence concerning the 
option provision. The language in the option provision is 
ambiguous and the trial court should have considered parol evidence 
regarding the option provision and the purchase price. The trial 
court, at a minimum, should have considered parol evidence to first 
determine whether the lease and option provision was intended as an 
integrated contract before excluding evidence under the parol 
evidence rule. The trial court failed to make this determination. 
The trial court erred in striking Rukavina's Motion to 
Enforce the Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties v. Barney. 
Rukavina is clearly a third party beneficiary to this contract, 
being named therein, and the Settlement Agreement specifically 
refers to Rukavina and the enforcement of the option provision and 
lease at issue in this case. Rukavina's Motion to Enforce this 
Settlement Agreement should not have been stricken, but should have 
been considered on the merits by the court. 
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The trial court erred in reinstating the April 20, 1993, 
Judgment which was previously vacated for lack of standing and 
jurisdiction, pursuant to 16-10a-1502 UCA, which precludes a 
foreign corporation from bringing or maintaining an action in the 
State until an application is filed with the division. The court 
does not have jurisdiction over any matter brought by a foreign 
corporation until an application is filed and this jurisdiction 
cannot be retroactively applied. 
The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing 
Rukavina to amend his complaint. CTX had plenty of opportunity to 
answer the amended complaint and complete discovery before trial. 
Finally, trial court erred in dismissing the Third Party 
Complaint against Barney under Rule 4 URCP for untimely service, 
after Barney had accepted service of the Third Party Complaint and 
had filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CTX'S MOTION 
TO ENFORCE A SETTLEMENT OFFER MADE AFTER CTX 
UNILATERALLY CHANGED THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT 
OFFER AND PROCEEDED CONTRARY TO ITS TERMS. 
In order for a settlement agreement to be enforced, it 
must meet all the essential elements of a contract. Goodmanson v. 
Liberty Vending Systems, 866 P.2d 581, (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
In this case an offer was made to settle this case in a 
package deal with four other cases, currently pending before the 
Third District Court. CTX then refused to settle all the cases as 
discussed. One of the cases to be settled was CTX Properties, Inc. 
v. Anthony Duran. Civil No. 930904765 CN, before the Honorable 
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William B. Bohling. In that case, CTX agreed that Anthony Duran, 
a step-brother of Rukavina, could purchase the home at 60 West 
Stauffer Lane, Murray, Utah, This was important to Rukavina, 
because Anthony Duran and Rukavina's mother were currently living 
in this home. 
It was agreed that the purchase price of Anthony's home 
would be the average of two appraisals, one to be submitted by each 
party. Anthony Duran had obtained an appraisal in the amount of 
$71,500.00. In settlement Anthony Duran and Rukavina requested 
that Anthony be able to submit the $71,500.00 appraisal in 
averaging the price for the home, and they requested that the 
Settlement Agreements expressly provide for this. 
CTX refused to agree to this. As a result, the settle-
ment agreements, as prepared, were not agreed to or executed by 
Anthony Duran or Rukavina. None of the settlement agreements 
prepared in the other four cases have been agreed to or executed by 
the parties in each case. 
The parties knew and understood that there had not been 
an understanding reached on all the terms of the global settlement 
offer discussed. The parties' conduct is evidence of this. 
Rukavina refused to execute the Settlement Agreement and CTX 
elected to continue with litigation in all the cases. CTX 
continued with its Motion to Compel Discovery and its Motion to 
Dismiss the Third-Party Complaint, which were heard on April 3, 
1995, more than two weeks after the global settlement offer was 
discussed. 
- 26 -
The settlement offer made in this case was a package 
deal, requiring the settlement of four other cases, pending before 
the Third District Court. The parties failed to reach a meeting of 
the minds concerning all the essential terms in settling all five 
cases, 
Specifially, the parties failed to agree on a purchase 
price for Anthony Duran's home, which was a major consideration 
discussed in the settlement of this case. As a result, Rukavina 
did not execute the proposed Settlement Agreement and CTX continued 
with litigation. It was improper for the trial court to enforce 
the limited terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement in this 
case, when the settlement agreement discussed was conditioned on 
the settlement of four other cases. 
Furthermore, the other cases which were part of the 
global settlement offer have not been settled on the terms 
discussed. In Anthony Duran's case, CTX withdrew it Motion to 
Enforce Settlement and sought a Writ of Restitution. The case of 
Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, is currently on appeal, on other 
grounds, before the Utah Supreme Court. (Appeal No. 950172). 
B. THE OPTION PROVISION IN THE LEASE AGREEMENT 
IS AMBIGUOUS; THEREFORE, THE COURT ERRED 
IN STRIKING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AND GRANTING 
CTX'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. 
Because the disposition of a case on a judgment on the 
pleadings denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, the court 
must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing 
party, and grant or affirm only when it appears that there is no 
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set of circumstances alleged wherein a party may prevail. Themy v. 
Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979) . 
In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings the 
court must view all facts alleged in the compliant as true, with 
all inferences being resolved in favor of the non-moving party. 
Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
The trial court should not have granted judgment on the 
pleadings in this case. In the pleadings filed by Rukavina he 
claims that he is an owner of the property pursuant to the lease 
and an option to purchase contained in the lease, which he timely, 
or in good faith attempted to timely, exercise. In accepting the 
allegations in Rukavina's pleadings as true, the court could not 
have granted judgment on the pleadings against Rukavina in this 
case. It may be found that Rukavina is entitled to possession 
pursuant to the option contained in the lease, as a result of the 
promises made by CTX, the waiver by CTX, a mutual mistake of the 
parties at the time the option was entered into, or under the 
Settlement Agreement entered into by CTX and Barney, wherein CTX 
agrees to honor the lease and option on Rukavina's behalf. 
Furthermore, the terms in the option provision are not 
too indefinite, as a matter of law, to be enforceable, as a method 
was agreed to at the time for calculating a purchase price for the 
property. This agreed method is definite enough for an option to 
purchase real estate. Property Assistance v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976 
(Utah App. 1989) . As argued further below, at a minimum, the 
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language in the option provision is ambiguous, and parol evidence 
should have been considered by the court in determining first, 
whether the parties intended the option to be completely integrated 
and second, the parties' agreement as to a purchase price. 
Property Assistance v. Roberts, Id. 
C. THE OPTION AGREEMENT IS NOT AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER 
PAROL EVIDENCE IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT WAS INTENDED AS AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT. 
The question of interpretation of a contract is a 
question of law for the court. The court must determine by process 
of interpretation what the writing means. Before considering the 
applicability of the parol evidence rule in a contract dispute, the 
court must first determine whether the parties intended the writing 
to be an integrated contract. To resolve this question any 
relevant evidence is admissible. Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 
663, 665 (Utah 1985). The trial court erred in failing to first 
determine and rule on the issue as to whether the option was 
intended as integrated contract before ruling on the admissibility 
of parol evidence. JEd. at 665. 
The trial court should have considered all relevant 
evidence, including the affidavits of the individuals negotiating 
the contract, to determine if the contract was intended as an 
integrated contract. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers. 277 UAR 58 
(Ut.App. 1995) (when determining whether a contract is ambiguous, 
any relevant evidence must be considered. Other wise the determi-
nation of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely it is based 
solely on the "extrinsic evidence" of the judge's own linguistic 
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education and experience. Although the terms of an instrument may 
seem clear to a particular reader -including a judge- this does not 
rule out the possibility that the parties chose the language of the 
agreement to express a different meaning. A judge should therefore 
consider any credible evidence offered to show the parties' 
intention). Id. 
The affidavits submitted indicate that the option 
provision was not intended as an integrated contract. The 
affidavits set forth the specific terms agreed to in explanation of 
the language used in the option provision (last sentence of 
paragraph 15), stating that, "Each agent shall obtain a separate 
appraisal and at that time a fair sales price shall be determined." 
Furthermore, parol evidence should be considered when it 
appears that a complete and binding agreement may be voidable for 
fraud, duress, mutual mistake or the like, or it may be illegal. 
Warner v. Sirstins 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Ut.App. 1992) . Such invali-
dating causes need not and generally do not appear on the face of 
the writing. Therefore, parol evidence may be admitted to show 
mutual mistake occurring when both parties, at the time of 
contracting, share a misconception about a basic assumption or 
vital fact, upon which they base their bargain. Id. at 669. This 
is clearly shown in the affidavits submitted, as both parties 
assumed that the language they had chosen was sufficient to 
determine a purchase price for an enforceable option to purchase. 
Furthermore, even reading the face of the contract 
itself, indicates that the option provision was not intended as an 
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integrated contract. Paragraph 15 states that "there are no terms 
of this agreement different (sic) from any of the proceding (sic) 
numbered paragraphs or in addition thereto except the following:H 
(emphasis added). The option provision then follows. The option 
provision therefore, clearly was not intended as an integrated 
contract and the court should have considered all relevant evidence 
in interpreting the option provision. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING RUKAVINA'S MOTION 
TO ENFORCE A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED IN ANOTHER 
CASE, CTX PROPERTIES V. BARNEY, BASED ON A SEPARATE 
CONTRACT FROM THE LEASE AGREEMENT RULED ON IN CTX'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. 
The law in Utah is well settled that a third party 
beneficiary to a contract has the right to enforce the terms of the 
contract. This includes third party beneficiaries of settlement 
agreements. L&A Drywall. Inc. v. Whitmore Construction, 608 P.2d 
626 (Utah 1980). See also Hansen v. Greenriver Group. 748 P.2d 
1102, 1104 (Ut.App. 1988). 
CTX and Barney, entered into a Settlement Agreement in 
CTX Properties v. Eloise C. Barney. Civil No. 900903134 PR, and as 
a condition of that settlement, Barney requested that CTX honor the 
option provision with Rukavina. The Settlement Agreement with 
Barney specifically provides, in clear and unambiguous language, 
that CTX will honor the option agreement contained in the lease 
with Rukavina. 
By filing this action CTX breached the terms of its 
Settlement Agreement by asserting, that the option is unenforceable 
and by refusing to honor the option exercised by Rukavina. 
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Furthermore, any potential defense to the enforcement of the option 
agreement was waived by CTX in the Settlement Agreement. Surety 
Life Ins. Co. v. Rupp.. 853 P.2d 366, 370 (Ut.App. 1992) (a party 
may legally contract to waive a defense); Continental Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Utah Sec. Mortcr. , 701 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Utah 1985), (finding 
of trial court on summary judgment that unambiguous language in 
guaranty agreement waives guarantors' defenses is affirmed). 
Since Rukavina is a third party beneficiary to the 
Settlement Agreement, which specifically provides that CTX will 
honor the option entered into with Rukavina, and this is a separate 
agreement from the lease itself, Rukavina's Motion to Enforce the 
Settlement Agreement with Barney should not have been summarily 
stricken by the Court based on the Court's interpretation of the 
separate lease agreement entered into by Rukavina. 
Rukavina is entitled to the enforcement of the terms of 
the Settlement Agreement with Barney to protect his rights. 
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 
1982) (action for specific performance of option agreement to 
purchase realty granted and affirmed); Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 
P.2d 528 (Utah 1981); Garland v. Fleisch. 831 P.2d 107 (Utah 1992). 
E. THE APRIL 20, 1993 JUDGMENT WAS VACATED BY THE 
COURT FOR LACK OF STANDING AND JURISDICTION; 
THE COURT ERRED IN RETROACTIVELY REINSTATING 
THE APRIL 20, 1993 JUDGMENT. 
The trial court erred in reinstating the April 20, 1993 
Judgment which was previously vacated for lack of standing and 
jurisdiction. Utah Statute 16-10a-1502 U.C.A., precludes a foreign 
corporation from bringing or maintaining an action in the State 
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until an application is filed with the division. Therefore, the 
court does not have jurisdiction over any matter brought by a 
foreign corporation until an application is filed. This standing 
and thus, jurisdiction, cannot be applied retroactively. 
The rule regarding the construction of statutes is 
against retroactive application. Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 
952 (Utah 1987). § 68-3-3 U.C.A. specifically provides that a 
statute shall not be retroactively applied, unless it is so 
declared in the statute. There is no such declaration in this 
case. 
Two exceptions to this rule have been recognized and 
retroactive application has been allowed, when (1) there is a 
procedural amendment or (2) if the amendment is remedial, i.e. 
intended to clarify how the earlier law should have been under-
stood. Kofoed v. Industrial Commission. 872 P.2d 484 (Utah 1994) . 
There is no procedural or remedial amendment in this case; 
therefore, the application giving rise to CTX's standing to bring 
this action should not have been retroactively applied. 
F. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
RUKAVINA'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT. 
The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing 
Rukavina to amend his complaint. CTX was not unfairly prejudiced 
and had plenty of opportunity to answer the amended complaint, 
complete discovery and prepare for trial. 
The Third Party Defendants (as principals of the 
Plaintiff CTX) were well aware of the action, and Third Party 
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Defendant Barney actually accepted service of the Third Party 
Complaint and filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint. 
Rule 15 URCP, provides that a party may amend his 
pleading by leave of court and that leave of court shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. The primary considerations in 
considering a motion to amend are, whether the parties have 
adequate notice to meet the new issues, and whether any party 
receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage. Rinawood v. Foreign 
Auto Works, Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350 (Ut.App. 1990) cert, denied, 795 
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); See also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 
P.2d 455 (Utah 1983) (determination depends on whether opposing 
party would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue 
adjudicated for which he had not had time to prepare). 
In this case, there was no unfair advantage or unavoid-
able prejudice due to not enough time to prepare. On November 18, 
1994, pursuant to the Court's own Order a Scheduling Conference was 
held wherein cut-off dates and deadlines were set. A discovery 
deadline was set for February 28, 1995. A motion deadline was set 
for December 9, 1994. The Court set a hearing date on all motions 
for January 30, 1995 at 1:30. (Record 303). Rukavina's Motion to 
Amend was filed on the deadline set by the Court, December 9, 1994 
(Record 310) and well before the discovery deadline. 
CTX was not unduly prejudiced and had ample opportunity 
to conduct further discovery and prepare for any new issues. 
Rukavina's Motion to Amend should have been granted by the Court 
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and the denial of Rukavina's Motion to Amend in this case was an 
abuse of discretion. 
G. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE THIRD 
PARTY COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST WRIGHT AND BARNEY 
PURSUANT TO RULE 4 URCP, WHEN BARNEY HAD ACCEPTED 
SERVICE OF THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AND HAD 
ALREADY FILED AN ANSWER IN THE CASE. 
Rule 4(b) URCP, provides that "in any action brought 
against two or more defendants on which service has been obtained 
upon one of them within the 120 days or such longer period as may 
be allowed by the court, the other or others may be served or 
appear at any time prior to trial." 
The Third Party Complaint as against Barney should not 
have been dismissed for untimely service under Rule 4 (b) URCP after 
Barney agreed to accept service in the case and filed an Answer to 
the Third Party Complaint. Any claim regarding the untimely 
service of Barney was thereby waived. The Court's dismissal, 
although without prejudice, greatly adds to the delay and cost of 
litigation and therefore, should not be allowed in this case. 
Rule 4 (b) URCP provides that once one defendant is served 
the other defendants can be served or appear at any time prior to 
trial. This is to prevent the preclusion of adding additional 
defendants after three months. Valley Asphalt, Inc., v. Eldon J. 
Stubbs Contsr., Inc., 714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986). Barney, one of 
the Third Party Defendants in this case was served and therefore 
Wright, as an additional Third Party Defendant in this action, may 
be served at any time prior to trial. Id. 
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The trial court erred in dismissing the Third Party 
Complaint against Wright under Rule 4 URCP. The court certainly 
erred in dismissing Barney from the case after Barney had already 
accepted service of the Third Party Complaint and had filed an 
Answer to the Third Party Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in enforcing the settlement 
agreement in this case, which was part of a global settlement of 
four other cases, which was never agreed to by all the parties. 
The court erred in failing to make an initial determi-
nation, considering all the evidence, as to whether the parties 
intended the option provision to be an integrated contract, before 
ruling on the exclusion of parol evidence. 
The trial court erred in granting judgment on the 
pleadings, finding the option provision too indefinite to be 
enforceable, when there was a definite method agreed to for 
calculating the purchase price. The trial court erred in finding 
that the opiton provision was not ambiguous, so as to allow parol 
evidence to determine its meaning. 
The trail court erred in striking Rukavina's Motion to 
Enforce the Settlement Agreement entered in CTX v. Barney, a 
separate case, when Rukavina was clearly an intended beneficiary. 
The trial court erred in retroactively reinstating a 
judgment entered when CTX had no standing and the court had no 
jurisdiction over the matter. 
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Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Rukavina's Motion to Amend and in dismissing the Third Party 
Complaint, when Third Party Defendant, Barney had accepted service 
and filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
This Court should reverse the trial court's final Drder, 
and find that there was no global settlement reached as the parties 
discussed and CTX is not entitled to unilaterally change the terms 
of the settlement discussed, to enforce settlement in this case, 
while proceeding with litigation in this case as well as the other 
cases. 
This Court should find that the option provision was not 
intended as an integrated contract and that it is ambiguous, thus 
requiring the consideration of parol evidence. This Court, upon 
consideration of all the evidence, should find that there was a 
definite method agreed to for calculating the purchase price, and 
thus, the option is enforceable as a matter of law. 
This Court should vacate the trial court's Judgment on 
the Pleadings and allow Rukavina to file his amended pleadings, to 
proceed against the Third Party Defendants, and be entitled to have 
a hearing on the merits of his Motion to Enforce the Settlement 
Agreement entered into between CTX and Barney. 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 1996. 
SMITH & HANNA 
By: j^st*^+j/J~£&^C 
Bfeage W / C a l l 
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I hereby certify on the 2nd day of April, 1996, two (2) 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Paul T. Moxley 
Robert E. Mansfield 
PARRY, MURRAY, WARD & MOXLEY 
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Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS, MOTION TO STRIKE 
AND RESTITUTION OF PREMISES 
Civil No. 920906316 PR 
Judge Anne Stirba 
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to 
Strike came on for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba on 
the 5th day of April, 1993, at the hour of 1:30 o'clock p.m. Paul 
T. Moxley and Robert E. Mansfield of Campbell Maack & Sessions 
represented Plaintiff. Dennis L. Mangrum represented Defendant 
Andy Rukavina. 
The Court, having considered Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings and Motion to Strike and the memoranda submitted 
in support of and in opposition thereto and having heard and 
considered the arguments of counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike extrinsic evidence raised 
by Defendant in his Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby granted; 
2. Paragraph 15 of the Lease provision is clear and 
unambiguous as a matter of law in that it does not contain a 
purchase price or a sufficiently definite method for determining 
the purchase price; 
3. Paragraph 15 of the Lease provision constitutes nothing 
more than an agreement to agree; 
4. Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is 
hereby granted and Defendant is ordered to immediately vacate the 
subject premises located at 5646 Magic Isle Lane, Murray, Utah, and 
to return possession to Plaintiff; and 
5. Damages which Plaintiff has sustained as a result of 
Defendant's unlawful detainer and an award of reasonable attorney's 
fees, as provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 (Supp. 1992), 
shall be determined in a supplemental order. 
Dated this ^ ^ W i a y of April, 1993. 
ANNp M. STIRBA 
District Court Judge 
2 
Approved as to form this day of April, 1993: 
Dennis Mangrum 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the 
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth 
Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and that 
in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUBGMHNT Of* THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE was dopocited in LhU Uni Lea States TMM, i t^.ihjy -UEgpaid, 
addressed to the following this T day of April, 1993: 
Dennis L. Mangrum 
7110 South Highland Drive 




M. Shane Smith (3007) 
Douglas R. Short (5344) 
SMITH 8c HANNA, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CTX PROPERTIES, INC., A 
NEVADA CORPORATION, 
: ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
ANDY RUKAVINA, AN INDIVIDUAL : Civil No. 920906316R 
: Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Defendant. : 
Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Judgment against Defendant, 
Andy Rukavina, having come regularly before the Court, and the 
Court having been fully advised in the premises, and for good cause 
having been shown, and based on the Stipulation of Defendant 
entered in open Court that Plaintiff be allowed to retain 
possession of the subject residence pending further hearing on this 
matter: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Judgment is granted, therefore the 
order entered by this Court on April 20, 1993, declaring the option 
agreement unenforceable is hereby vacated; Although the court 
reserves as a matter of law whether the prior judgment was void or 
voidable; 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Sail Lake County Utah 
NOV 2 G jfe-j 
\Cl/ Deputy Cleri 
IT BE AT FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff, CTX Properties, 
remain in possession of the property pending further hearing of 
this matter. . 
DATED this ^S ' day of November, 1994 
BY THE COURT: 
Anne M. Sti 
District Court 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
) duAl ( -
1 Moxley 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify on the cvc^ day of November, 1994, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT was 
delivered, to the following: 
Paul T. Moxley 
Gayanne Schmid 
PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
r 




Paul T. Moxley (2342) 
Brad W. Merrill (6932) 
PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-3434 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILED IN CLSRK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
m&i/t 
Deputy CUwfc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO REINSTATE JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS OR JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS AND DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE 
Civil No. 920906316 DR 
Judge Anne Stirba 
day of At a hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba or the thirtieth 
January, 1995, at the hour of 1:30 o'clock p.m. the court considered the following 
Motions: Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate Judgment and for judgment on the Pleadings; 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Answers to interrogatories; 
Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer to Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint: 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Specific Enforcement of 
Settlement Agreement; Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Specific 
r? $«$5'43 
Enforcement of Option Agreement; and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgement. Paul T. Moxley and Brad W. Merrill of Parry 
Murray Ward & Moxley represented Plaintiff. Budge W. Call represented Defendant 
Andy Rukavina. 
As a preliminary matter, the Court recognized that Plaintiff's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees is still pending and shall be determined in a subsequent order. 
The Court, having considered these various Motions and the 
Memorandum, affidavits and exhibits submitted in supoort thereof and raving 
reviewed the entire file and heard ana consice-ed the arguments of counsel, and for 
good cause appearing therefor 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate Judgment and for Judgment on the 
Pleadings is hereby granted and the Court's April 20; 1993 Order Granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is heresy reinstated; 
2. All of the Court's previous Endings of fact with regard to its April 
20, 1993 Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for . jdgme-rt on the Pleadings are hereby 
incorporated by reference into this O-Jer. Specifically 
a. Paragraph 15 of r e Lease covision is clear a^d 
unambiguous as a matter of law in that it dees not certain a purchase ence or a 
sufficiently definite method for determining the purchase price: 
b. Paragraph 15 of the Lease provision constitutes nothing 
2 
more than an agreement to agree; 
3. The Court took under advisement whether Plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings should be converted to a Motion for Summan/ Judgment 
insomuch as the Court considered and reviewed affidavits and exhibits submitted by 
the parties and will subsequently render its own written Order; 
4. Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend Answer to Counterclaim 
and Third Party Complaint is hereby denied as untimely and prejudicial to Plaintiff; 
5. With regard to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of 
Documents and Answers to Interrogatories, the Court directs counsel to cooperate to 
accomplish all necessary discovery; but (a) Defendants are to produce their witness 
list to plaintiffs without further delay; and, (b) Defendant's witness list is not protected 
under the attorney client privilege or as attorney work product privilege; 
8. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motions for Summary 
Judgment is hereby granted in that Defendant's claims in which his Motions for 
Summary Judgment are based are denied due to the Court's denial of Defendant's 
Motion for Leave to Amend Answer: 
9. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement is hereby stricken; 
10. Defendant's Motion of Partial Summan/ Judgment to Enforce 
Option Agreement is hereby stricken; 
11. Damages which Plaintiff has sustained as a result of Defendant's 
3 
W 5 49 
unlawful detainer and an award of reasonable attorney s fees, as provided for in Utah 
Code Ann § 78-36-10 (Supp 1994), shall be determined in a supplemental order 
DATED this ^ T ^ V of YSQ[ 7 1995. 
Approved as to form 
ANNE M STIRB 
District Court Ju> 
Budge W Call 
Attorney for Defendant 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on January 3 1 , 1995, a true and correct copy of 
the ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REINSTATE JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS OR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR LEAVE was mailed, postage prepaid to the fol lowing: 
M. Shane Smith, Esq. 
Budge W. Call, Esq. 
SMITH & HANNA 
311 South State Street, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
•ewssi 
ADDENDUM D 
Paul T. Moxley, Esq. (#A2342) 
Robert E. Mansfield, Esq. (#A6272) 
PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 By 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




ANDY RUKAVINA, ] 
Defendant. 
\ SECOND REVISED ORDER 
\ AND JUDGMENT 
| Z20ZW 
\ < v > i - ^ - £; o^ as>^ 
\ Civil No. 920906316PR 
The Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc/s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement came on for 
hearing before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding, at the hour 
of 3:00 p.m. on June 12, 1995. Plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc. was represented by its counsel, 
Paul T. Moxley and Robert E. Mansfield of Parry Murray Ward & Moxley. Defendant Andy 
Rukavina was represented by his counsel, Budge W. Call of Smith & Hanna, and third party 
defendant Eloise Barney was represented by her counsel, Lynn Mabey. 
^ M $ ^ 
Based upon the memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to plaintiffs Motion 
to Enforce Settlement Agreement, the arguments of counsel and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Shane Smith's letter dated March 16, 1995, which is attached as Exhibit "B" to 
plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, is a clear 
acceptance of Paul T. Moxley's letter dated March 14, 1995, which is attached as Exhibit "A" 
to plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. 
2. The settlement agreement was clear and unambiguous and the parties had a 
meeting of the minds on all material terms involved in the settlement of the present case. 
3. The parties agreed to dismiss all claims which each party had against the other 
party or its agents and that CTX Properties, Inc. would pay defendant Rukavina the sum of 
$2,500.00. 
4. CTX Properties, Inc. has waived its requirement for a global settlement of all 
cases in which it is involved with the defendant or the defendant's relatives. 
5. The waiver of this ancillary term by CTX Properties, Inc. does not affect the 
settlement of the present case. 
6. Plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc/s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is 
granted and the terms of the Settlement Agreement are adopted. 
7. All causes of action set forth in defendant Andy Rukavina's Counterclaim are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
8. The Court previously dismissed without prejudice defendant Andy Rukavina's 
Third Party Complaint on April 3, 1995. 
2 
9. However, the dismissal of the Third Party Complaint without prejudice is not a 
ruling by this Court of the legal effect of the settlement agreement. 
10. All causes of action and claims set forth in plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc/s 
Complaint are dismissed with prejudice. 
11. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Rukavina and against Plaintiff CTX 
Properties, Inc. in the amount of $2,500.00. 
DATED this°ft day of A^ust, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Anne M. Stirba 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
M. Shane Smith 
Budge W. Call 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Andy Rukavina 
3 9 0 0 8 9? 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing REVISED ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT, was hand delivered this X- day of August 1995, to the following: 
M. Shane Smith 
Budge W. Call 
SMITH & HANNA 
311 South State Street 
Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
L. Benson Mabey 
MURPHY TOLBOE & MABEY 
124 South 600 East 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
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ADDENDUM E 
o 
M. Shane Smith (3007) 
Budge W. Call (5047) 
SMITH Sc HANNA, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
311 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CTX PROPERTIES, INC., 





NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 920906316PR 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant and Appellant, 
Andy Rukavina, by and through his attorneys, M. Shane Smith and 
Budge W. Call of Smith & Hanna, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court 
the final Judgment of the Honorable Anne M. Stirba entered in this 
matter on September 20, 1995. 
This appeal is taken from the trial court's ruling on 
Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement entered on 
September 20, 1995, and the trial court's ruling on summary 
judgment issued during the proceeding. 
DATED this y j day of September, 1995. 
SMITH & HANNA 
^tfdqe W.^Call v 
ii ft 8 § $ *< 
ADDENDUM F 
Paul T. Moxley, Esq. (#A2342) 
Robert E. Mansfield, Esq. (#A6272) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ASR, INC., a Nevada Corporation, 
Plaintiff, } ORDER 
v. } 
MARK DURAN and LYNETTE } Civil No. 920906315PR 
DURAN, husband and wife, } 
} The Honorable Glen Iwasaki 
Defendants. } 
Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, Motion for Stay or for 
Extension of Time, Motion to Dismiss Third Party Complaint and Motion for Sanctions and 
Renewed Motion to Compel and Defendants' Motion to Amend and Motions for Summary 
Judgment came on before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Glen Iwasaki presiding, on 
May 22, 1995 at the hour of 11:00 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by its counsel, Robert E. 
Mansfield of Parry Murray Ward & Moxley, and defendants Mark and Lynette Duran were 
represented by their counsel, Shane Smith and Budge Call of Smith & Hanna. 
Based upon the memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the above-
named motions, the argument of counsel and for good cause appearing, 
SMfH<j HANNA 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Specifically Enforce Settlement Agreement is 
denied. 
2. The Court finds that there was no meeting of the minds as to the 
essential terms of the Settlement Agreement. 
3. Defendants' Motion to Amend is denied as to all causes of action 
regarding enforcement of the option provision. 
4. The Court finds that plaintiff would be prejudiced by the amendment of 
the Counterclaim involving causes of action relating to the alleged option provision. 
5. However, defendants shall be entitled to file an amended complaint 
asserting causes of action on defendants' claim for improvements to the subject property. 
6. Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Third Party Complaint is granted and 
defendants' Third Party Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. 
7. Eloise Barney's Answer, Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint is 
dismissed without prejudice. 
8. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding enforcement of 
option provision is denied inasmuch as the Court previously has ruled on the enforceability of 
the option provision and found that it is not enforceable. 
9. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to enforce the 
settlement agreement in the case of CTX Properties, Inc. v. Barney is not properly before the 
Court inasmuch as plaintiff has not yet had an opportunity to respond to this motion. 
2 
10. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days from the date hereof in which to 
respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
11. Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions and to Compel is stayed pending 
plaintiffs submittal of specific deficiencies with defendants' discovery responses. 
12. The parties shall work together to set new dates for witness designation. 
DATED this day of May, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Glen Iwasaki 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SMITH & HANNA 
Budge W. Call, Esq. 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _ day of May, 1995, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered, to the following: 
M. Shane Smith 
Budge W. Call 
SMITH & HANNA 
311 South State Street 
Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
4 
ADDENDUM G 
Paul T. Moxley (#A2342) 
Robert E. Mansfield (#A6272) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
R E C E I V E D 
MAY 2 3 1995 
SMITH &HANNA 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




ANTHONY DURAN, an individual; IHC 
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah corporation, 
dba CREDIT ASSURANCE AGENCY; 
SBK, Inc., a Utah Corporation, 
dba STEPHEN WADE AUTOMOTIVE 
GROUP; THE STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through THE UTAH HIGHER 
EDUCATION ASSISTANCE 
AUTHORITY; UNIVERSITY 
HOSPITAL; JOSEPH R. JOHNSON 
AND ELOISE JOHNSON; AND 




NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL 
OF MOTION TO ENFORCE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 930904765CN 
The Honorable William H. Bohling 
v. 




MICHAEL WRIGHT and 
ELOISE C. BARNEY, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc., hereby withdraws 
its Motion to Specifically Enforce Settlement Agreement in this case based on the grounds 
that plaintiff will not receive the benefit of its bargain inasmuch as Judge Iwasaki has ruled ' 
that a settlement agreement in a companion case, which was part of the com deration for the 
settlement of this case, was not reached. 
us y&-DATED thi  day of May, 1995. 
& MOXLEY 
PauF T^#lox\ey, Es 
Robert E. Mansfield, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff > 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT was hand-1 
delivered, this J& day of May, 1995, to the following: 
M. Shane Smith 
Budge W. Call 
SMITH & HANNA 
311 South State Street 
Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
3 
M4Y 2 3 ^ " 
SMfTH & HANNA 
Paul T. Moxley (#A2342) 
Robert E. Mansfield (#A6272) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CTX PROPERTIES, Inc., a Nevada } 
corporation, } 
Plaintiff, } 
v. } NOTICE OF HEARING 
ANTHONY DURAN, an individual; MC } 
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah corporation, } 
dba CREDIT ASSURANCE AGENCY; } 
SBK, Inc., a Utah Corporation, } 
dba STEPHEN WADE AUTOMOTIVE } Civil No. 930904765CN 
GROUP; THE STATE OF UTAH, by and } 
through THE UTAH HIGHER } 
EDUCATION ASSISTANCE } 
AUTHORITY; UNIVERSITY } The Honorable William B. Bohling 
HOSPITAL; JOSEPH R. JOHNSON } 
AND ELOISE JOHNSON; AND } 










MICHAEL WRIGHT and 
ELOISE C. BARNEY, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc.'s Motion for Writ 
of Restitution shall be heard before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable William B. 
Bohling presiding, on Monday, June 5, 1995 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. 
DATED this 3> day of May, 1995. 
IAY WARD & MOXLEY 
4^*^4*0*** 
loxley, Esq. 
Robert E. Mansfield, Eso* 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
HEARING was hand-delivered, this _ day of May, 1995, to the following: 
M. Shane Smith 
Budge W. Call 
SMITH & HANNA 
311 South State Street, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Paul TT Moxley 
Robert E. Mansfield 




MAY 1 8 1995 
SMfTH&HANNA 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




TRIATLANTIC VENTURE, INC 
VIDEO SHOPPING MALL, DEFENDANT 





CASE NUMBER 910907087 CV 
DATE 05/17/95 
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK DAG 
4-501 RULING 
DEFENDANT MICHAEL WRIGHT'S MOTION TO VACATE NOTICE OF 
APPEAL AND TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS DENIED. 
CC: PAUL MOXLEY 
KENNETH YEATES 
RICHARD DAY 
M. SHANE SMITH 
